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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		Date
		8/29/84
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. ACDA/NWC - Kathy Strang		
2. OES/NEC - Carl Stoiber		
3. S/NP - Al Labowitz		
4.		
5.		
Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	For Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

Attached is a new set of talking points on the Houston case by Carl Stoiber (slightly modified by Dick Stratford and I). Please let me have your comments/clearance by 10:15 this morning.

URGENT

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Sharon Ahmad, Senior Reviewer

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

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OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
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① -- I have been advised that our Departments have been in close touch concerning a prosecution currently underway in Houston, ~~where indictments have been returned~~ against three persons, ~~one~~ a Pakistani national--for ~~wrongfully~~ attempting to export microswitches of a type which has applications in nuclear weapons development. We appreciate ~~the ability to continue these sensitive consultations on a confidential basis.~~

② -- The Department of State is particularly interested in the course of this prosecution because of its potential impact on important foreign policy and national security interests.

③ -- As part of the President's non-proliferation policy, we frequently urge other governments to take action to halt the export of items to Pakistan which might enable that nation to develop nuclear explosives. We have had good cooperation, so far--and in fact, some other nations have ~~successfully~~ prosecuted Pakistani nationals for such misconduct. Canada and the Netherlands have taken especially strong ~~prosecutive~~ prosecutive action steps.

⑤ -- We recognize, of course, that your Department exercises ~~the final~~ prosecutorial discretion in these cases, based on an assessment of the factual and legal strength of the evidence, and other relevant factors. ~~We are not and will not second guess your exercise of that discretion; we simply want to convey~~

④ -- ~~However,~~ To the extent that broader national interests (including the vital task of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations) may be relevant to your judgments about how to proceed with this case, I wanted to express the Department of State's view that this prosecution warrants the most vigorous federal action. Any appearance that we were not proceeding ~~against the indicted subjects of this case~~ within the full limits of U.S. law could affect our ability to persuade other nations to also take effective action against similar violations.

alleged

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Sharon Ahmad, Senior Reviewer

our view of the importance of the foreign policy factor in this case..

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